The Retardation of Rank

Rank retards you.

And the organization. Most successful organizations have figured this out, but the military has decided that it is an exception. The fact remains that a top-down, hierarchical command structure causes more harm than good. It results in inefficiencies, poor decision making, built in excuses for failure, and, worst of all, prevents the rank and file from reaching their potential as resources in the organization.

The problem with a strict rank hierarchy is that is enforces and reinforces a psychology of inferiority. Indeed, that is what is is meant to do: to remind those of lesser rank that their superiors are just that. The problem is that "superior" begins to mean all sorts of things that it is not, i.e, intellectual and moral superiority.

Any organization exists to solve problems. In the case of the Army, that truth is plainly evident. We don't deploy for kicks. The problems facing the modern American military are complex and deep. They require creative thinking and a systematic approach.

Decision makers in the Army rely on their rank to give their decisions force. Many times their decisions are good. Everyone makes good decisions. But everyone also makes bad decisions at times, and any smart organization would try to mitigate them or set up systems to keep them in check.

There are three ways in which the Army rank system thwarts good decisions:

First, most people end up making decisions not based on what is best for the organization, but based on the course of action most likely to please (or least likely to displease) their superiors. Such is human nature. Rank is inherently very conservative-- the rigidity is specifically designed to maintain the status quo, and ends up almost guaranteeing that the organization will shy from risk.

It is natural in armed conflict to be averse to risk, because the the results can often be death. History, however, is replete with examples of risk aversion leading to more suffering in the long term. But I digress. The point is that most Soldiers would rather make a mediocre or poor decision that will please a superior than a bad one that will upset the order.

Second, In a command structure, one's decision-making powers increase with his progression in rank. Thus, as one gets more responsibility to make choices, he surpasses more people on the totem pole. So naturally there are more below than there are above.

With more responsibility comes decisions of greater import. There are always going to be better ideas when more people are involved in the process. So as leaders need more minds on their problems, they systematically ignore them. Good decision-making power is summarily and perilously dismissed on the basis of rank inferiority.

Finally, rank and its trappings impede a healthy flow of information up and down the chain. James Surowiecki explains it nicely in his bestselling book, The Wisdom of Crowds:

"To state the obvious, unless people know what the truth is, it's unlikely they'll make the right decisions. This means being honest about performance. It means being honest about what's not happening. It means being honest about expectations. Unfortunately, there's little evidence that this kind of sharing takes place....One of the things that gets in the way of the exchange of real information is the deep-rooted hostility on the part of bosses to opposition from subordinates. This is the real cost of a top-down approach to decision making: it confers the illusion of perfectability upon the decision makers and encourages everyone else simply to play along. What makes this especially damaging is that people in an organization already have a natural inclination to avoid conflict and potential trouble. It's remarkable, in fact, that in an autocratic organization good information ever surfaces.

Th rigidity of military rank makes good decision making very difficult, and often impossible. Until it is too late, when the effects of poor decisions are already being felt. If decisions were made from the bottom up, or by people closest to the problems, then better choices would emerge.

Army Mal-Education

There is a huge contradiction in the Army that bothers me particularly, probably because I am a teacher in my civilian life. There are many special programs offering us "free" education," yet the system seems to discourage Soldiers from acquiring more of it.

Now I know many will contend that is not true. I personally have seen dozens of Soldiers in classes, and according to folks at the Laura Bush Education Center here at Camp Bondsteel, nearly 300 troops are taking advantage of the education programs.

But, the vast majority are not. We have almost 2,000 Soldiers here, most of whom do not have college degrees. The command here is concerned about the number of Soldiers dropping classes. It was recently reported from on high that many classes would be cancelled because of lack of enrollment.

At the top, the Army would like everyone to have at least an associates degree. A smarter force is in everyone's best interest.

Why then , on this deployment aren't leaders more flexible in making these opportunities available to Soldiers. There is no excuse why a troop should not go home with at least 18 units under his belt.

I have yet to see a leader truly encourage his Soldiers to get educated. Many will say mission first. Why isn't getting educated part of the mission. Can't a Soldier, who is willing to dedicate many of his free hours to study, be given less hours in the field, on patrol, or in the office? Shouldn't a leader find it within his prerogative to let the Soldier study during the slow times during the work day?

Leaders are not giving their troops the time necessary to succeed. Why?

Three likely reasons come to mind.

1. Education undermines the Army system. In the civilian world, education opens opportunities for advancement, and bestows expertise and credibility, whereas in the Army, time in service, tours, and rank does. A parallel path instills fear in those who rely on the latter.

However, a Soldier with rank and experience should be able, willing, and good at incorporating a younger Soldier's education into the mission. It will enhance his team and his leadership.

2. Formal education's benefits are not directly visible in Army duties. Holding ground, patrolling a route, or clearing a building are all very kinetic tasks. Their performance relies on mastery or certain motions and reactions. Whether someone is good at math or understands the perspectives of the First World War has no perceivable effect on his accomplishment of any of the actions listed above.

Yet, if Soldier's have a better understanding of their world, they will be able to understand what is required of them even in the most myopic sense. And, the discipline, organization, and analytic skills that come with formal education will help every Soldier perform his job better, reactions more quickly, assess and develop better courses of action, and take proactive steps to avert crises.

3. Leaders are not educated, and don't see its value. Politicians have implemented all the programs available for Army education. It makes them look good. But the Soldiers who lead do not put it in the same high esteem as their civilian counterparts.

It is up to higher commands and civilian leadership to impress upon everyone the reality that a more educated Army is a more effective Army.

How Efficient Is the Army?

The entry below originally appeared on my blog, "Musings of a Factotum back in February 2009." It is one of several repostings that fit the theme of My PA blog.

I was a Truck Commander today. That’s a glorified way of saying that I sat in the passenger seat while my buddy drove the humvee from the dispatch lot to our working area.


We had been assigned a vehicle, but the only one available was a tactical humvee. With any tactical vehicle come too many rules and restrictions. You need a ground guide to move in and out of parking lots, Kevlar helmets must be worn by all vehicle occupants, and drivers need to place blocks and drip pans whenever shutting down. So even though we are only driving the truck on paved roads in a one-mile radius at no more than 18 miles per hour, we are burdened with all these inefficiencies.

I understand that the United States Army is not designed to run with ruthless drive for profits. But the mentality of thoroughness translates into other areas. It took several man-hours to get the vehicle signed over to us. Two Specialists, a Sergeant First Class, a Major, and a civilian contractor all had their hands in the transaction. What productive items of business could at least some of these soldiers been engaged in?

There is no such thing as “military efficiency.” The U.S. Army is not efficient. It is thorough. Thoroughness can serve us well, but should it be the highest priority?
How many bright, talented people are stifled in the military because they are forced to comply with endless regulations and redundancies? In the world of the Army, even these people, as smart as they may be, end up as mindless automatons, more worried about compliance and approval from their superiors than about getting a job done right.

Frustration is the call word, even among these people. Everyone in the Army loves to say express how screwed up it is. One high-ranking officer told me not too long ago, “You need to become an officer so you can fix this.”

“You’re an officer!,” I shouted in my mind! It seems everyone can see how fouled up the system is, but no one sees how screwed up it is in their own area of responsibility, and nobody wants to tell their superiors that the way we’ve been doing it sucks.

At Basic Training, when I thought twice about executing a command that sounded mistaken, my drill sergeant told me not to second guess myself. As I noted then, even when you’re right, you look like an ass if you’re the only one.

That truism holds in the everyday institutional army. It is much easier to hide behind caution smothered in ineffectiveness, then to tread into open ground of risk, where the potential of figuring out better ways to do things lurk.

The Army is effective at being a behemoth of an organization, and can run itself for the sake of running itself.

Rank Is Obsolete

It is an oft-repeated line in the Army that “we have a rank structure.” It is usually said by Soldiers to their inferiors as a way to excuse their lack of logic applied to a particular decision. They will maintain that the rank system, with its power and privileges, creates a smoother running organization—one that is quick and absolute in times of crisis. If it weren’t for rank, the argument goes, then there would be friction at all levels of decision-making and communication. Subordinates would question their leaders, and parallel parts would move in dissonance.

But what of other organizations that are much more efficient without rank?

A well-run school, for instance, surely relies on a power hierarchy; but the absolutes that accompany rank are absent. Juniors are free to question their superiors and push back on controversial decisions. Many items are brought to the vote of committees and informal groups, where give and take, compromise, and consensus rule the day.

But every organization must have some type of hierarchy in order to get things done. Well, maybe not. Malcolm Gladwell writes of Gore Industries (manufacturers of Gore-Tex) in his bestseller, The Tipping Point, that relatively small groups of employees get work done in a very efficient and effective way. There are no rank privileges, and bosses are not afforded any undue authority. Everyone works as a team, and they have a very successful business.

But in wartime, neither the taxpayer nor and the Soldier has the luxury of such cavalier associations, according to the rank theory. The risks are too great, one may argue, and the price for deliberation or indecision too high.

The fatal flaw in the argument is that it assumes a wartime posture. Fortunately, however, the United States military is rarely in a combat posture. For example, even during “wartime,” most Soldiers are in training or a readiness mode. Deployments take only a fraction of the professional Soldier’s obligation. Even when an element is deployed to a forward position, few of the Soldiers actually work in combat jobs. Out of all those, even fewer see battle.

Many who have been in forward deployments may debate this, but the fact of the matter is that out of all the man-hours available in the Army, very, very few are spent in scenarios in which split-second decisions mean life or death.

If that’s true, then wouldn’t an organizational model that encourages every worker to think through procedures and challenge bad decisions be better prepared for any situation, combat included? Just because things need to happen precisely in battle doesn’t mean that it can’t be well-thought and understood by everyone involved.
Besides, most military activities are not life-or-death situations. They are usually in preparation for a worst-case scenario, thus minimizing risk to the organization. What if the Army taught all Soldiers how to think and lead?

But thinking means questioning, and as a veritable aristocracy, the military elites would never allow for that sort of revolutionary change.

The modern American military is still very ancient in many ways. It’s rank structure, as we know it, is as old as nation-states themselves. Is it too radical to imagine a military in which rank is obsolete? Have we evolved enough to change our way of thinking?

I wonder if all the tasks the military has to accomplish could be better accomplished without the weight of rank bogging down decision-making. How many bad choices and policies could be avoided if underlings felt empowered to call it as they saw it? If more people questioned orders, and leaders anticipated questions, how much better would those orders be? If more could participate in the formulation of plans, how much more thorough would those plans be?

We have developed as a society in positive ways, tending toward democracy and active participation for all. We also have learned a lot about how humans think and what motivates them. Might it be time for the military to catch up?

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